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MOTION OF LAW PROFESSORS FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER
Amici curiae law professors respectfully move
this Court for leave to file the enclosed brief in support of petitioner. Petitioner has consented to the
filing of this brief via a blanket consent letter on file
with this Court. Counsel for amici have twice attempted to contact counsel for respondents without
success, so their consent is presumed withheld.
Amici are scholars at U.S. law schools whose
research and teaching focus is intellectual property
law. Amici have no direct interest in the outcome of
this litigation. Amici are concerned that the Court of
Appeals’ decision below is based on an incorrect
understanding of the defenses of laches and acquiescence. Amici urge this Court to grant review of this
matter to provide much needed guidance on the operation of these two oft-claimed trademark defenses.
Such a ruling will increase certainty for trademark
holders, businesses, and promote the larger public
interest inherent in these claims.
VICTORIA F. PHILLIPS
Counsel of Record
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
(202) 274-4078
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned
Law Professors identified in Appendix A.1
Amici are scholars at U.S. law schools whose
research and teaching focus is intellectual property
law. Amici have no direct interest in the outcome of
this litigation. Amici are concerned that the Court of
Appeals’ decision below is based on an incorrect
understanding of the defenses of laches and acquiescence. Amici urge this Court to grant review of this
matter to provide much needed guidance on the
operation of these two oft-claimed trademark defenses. Such a ruling will increase certainty for trademark holders, businesses, and promote the larger
public interest inherent in these claims.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Federal Lanham Act provides that injunctive
relief, the primary remedy in trademark cases, is to
be granted in accordance with the principles of equity.
Expressly included among such equitable principles
1

The Parties were timely notified of the intent to file this
amicus brief pursuant to Rule 37.2. Petitioner has consented to
the filing of this brief via a blanket consent letter on file with
this Court. This brief was not authored in whole or in part by
counsel for any party. No one other than Amici and their counsel
made a monetary contribution to preparing or submitting this
brief. Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided only for
purposes of identification.

2
are the defenses of acquiescence, laches, and estoppel.
Naturally, these defenses have become commonplace
in defending against claims of trademark infringement. In the absence of a statute of limitations courts
rely on the doctrine of laches, for example, to determine when trademark infringement claims have
become stale. Our informal study of the district in
which this case arises shows that from 2005 to 2011,
nearly two thirds of answers filed in trademark cases
involved the laches defense.
The circuit courts, however, are in conflict over
the proper application of these defenses. Clear guidance is needed as to how the defenses should each be
distinctly applied, when these defenses ought to bar
injunctive relief, and the degree to which these defenses ought to be mitigated by the potential for
public confusion. Meanwhile, uncertainty regarding
these defenses creates obstacles to business, burdens
the consuming public and the courts, and encourages
forum shopping. The negative impacts of this uncertainty within trademark will only be resolved if the
Supreme Court issues an opinion as to the proper
legal test for each of these equitable defenses.
This case presents an ideal vehicle to address
this conflict and provide clarity in this important area
of trademark law.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

This Case Poses a Recurring Question in
Trademark Law.

This case is important because it presents a
frequently recurring question in the law of trademark
remedies. In trademark cases, claims of laches are
ubiquitous and injunctive relief is the primary remedy. Thus the relationship between a laches defense
and injunctive relief is an important issue in trademark law that will have an impact on a large number
of trademark disputes.
The Lanham Act authorizes courts to grant
injunctions and to award profits and damages subject
to the principles of equity.2 The defenses of acquiescence and laches are included among these equitable
principles.3 The doctrine of laches was meant to
promote the same kinds of concerns as a statute of
limitations and to promote the interests of the vigilant while disfavoring those who “slumber on their
rights.”4
Parties and the courts rely on the equitable
doctrine of laches as the primary tool to determine
when trademark infringement claims are stale. This
is because unlike patent and copyright law, federal
2

15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2001).
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(9).
4
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
3

4
trademark law contains no statute of limitations.5
Equitable doctrines are therefore the only available
timing defense, and they are particularly salient in
trademark cases.
Because the determination of laches involves an
evaluation of the relationship between inexcusable
delay and prejudice, the possibility of laches is pre6
sent in almost every trademark dispute. For instance, it is possible for laches to result when a
trademark owner delays only a short period of time
before asserting a claim if the defendant nonetheless
suffers great prejudice from the delay.7 Therefore,
whenever a trademark defendant continues to invest
in the use of a mark past the point in time at which
its owner could have brought suit, that defendant will
feel the effect of that delay and may seek to raise a
claim of laches. This is not to suggest that all such
claims are meritorious. It is simply a fact that laches
claims are commonplace in trademark litigation.
5

Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 189, 191 (2d
Cir. 1996).
6
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 965 F.2d
1020, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (stating that a determination of laches is made by weighing the length of delay, the
seriousness of prejudice, the reasonableness of excuses, and the
defendant’s conduct).
7
See Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing Gull Airbone Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694
F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“If only a short period of time
elapses between accrual of the claim and suit, the magnitude of
prejudice required before suit would be barred is great; if the
delay is lengthy, a lesser showing of prejudice is required.”).

5
Cases like this, in which a trademark owner has
delayed bringing suit for decades, are unexceptional
perhaps because the term of protection, unlike that in
patent or copyright law, is indefinite.
Although there are no systematic surveys of
trademark cases that quantify the ubiquity of laches,
an informal review of the docket in the Northern
District of Texas, where this case originated, indicates
that laches defenses are ubiquitous. We surveyed
cases that Bloomberg Law designated as civil trademark cases from 2005 to 2011 in the Northern District of Texas.8 Of those 100 cases, an answer was
filed in 69 of them. Eight cases were eliminated due
to insufficient records or failure to meet the criteria of
in fact being a trademark case with a filed answer.9
That left 61 “bona fide” answers. Of those, 38 pled
laches as a defense, while 23 did not. Therefore, our
analysis shows that from 2005 to 2011, nearly two
thirds (38 of 61) of answers filed in trademark cases
in the Northern District of Texas involved a laches
defense.
8

We chose July 2011 as our end date to ensure that sufficient time had passed for an answer to be filed in the case.
9
We struck four of those cases from our sample: one
because the docket was missing the original answer; one because
the answer was stricken by the court for failure to follow court
rules; and two because further investigation of the complaint
revealed there were no federal trademark claims. Of the remaining 65 answers, four more did not include any legal terminology
because they were one-line general denials or because they were
filed pro se.

6
Certainly, even that number is under-inclusive
because in this case, for example, the laches defense
was pled as part of a complaint for declaratory judgment, and not in an answer to a trademark case.10
So our sample did not include this case. And of
course, there may have been cases in which laches
was a significant issue, but the case settled or was
dismissed before an answer was filed.
Of course, injunctions are the staple remedy in
trademark law. “An injunction is the usual and
standard remedy once trademark infringement has
been found.” 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks & Unfair Competition, § 30:1 (4th ed.
2013).11 There are a variety of reasons why monetary
relief may not be adequate in trademark cases. Monetary damages are especially difficult to quantify in
trademark infringement.12 Trademark disputes often
involve indirect competition in goods and services (for
10

Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 781 F. Supp. 2d, 396, 400
(N.D. Tex. 2011).
11
See also Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc.,
522 F.3d 1200, 1209 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n ordinary trademark
infringement actions . . . Complete injunctions against infringing party are the order of the day.”); Restatement (Third) Unfair
Competition, § 35, comment b (1995) (“In cases of deceptive
marketing, trademark infringement, or trademark dilution, the
prevailing plaintiff is ordinarily awarded injunctive relief to
protect both the plaintiff and the public from the likelihood of
future harm.”).
12
Pure Foods v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797 (5th
Cir. 1954); 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks &
Unfair Competition, § 30:2 (4th ed. 2013).
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instance, when a defendant uses a similar mark on
dissimilar goods and service), making monetary
damages unavailable or inappropriate since loss of
sales is not an issue.13 Finally, the continuation of
infringement often warrants injunctive relief.14
Given that injunctive relief is traditional in
trademark cases, and that laches claims are common,
the relationship between the two is of considerable
concern to trademark owners, their competitors, and
the public.
II.

The Doctrines of Laches and Acquiescence
in Trademark Law Remain Muddled and
in Need of This Court’s Intervention.

Section 33(b)(9) of the Lanham Act states: “That
equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and
acquiescence, are applicable.”15 In order to give every
word in the statute effect, laches, estoppel, and
acquiescence must have different elements. Yet some
courts have confused the three doctrines, and this
confusion has resulted in inconsistent application of
the rules. In order for courts to successfully reach fair
and consistent decisions in these cases, there must be
clear guidance on the doctrines of laches and acquiescence.
13

Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451
F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971).
14
6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 30:2.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).

8
As noted in the petition, the circuit courts are
squarely in conflict over the application of these
doctrines: some favor injunctive relief prohibiting a
defendant’s further use of a mark despite the presence of valid laches or acquiescence defenses;16 some
rule presumptively, or even conclusively, in favor of
the defendant if the plaintiff trademark holder delays
overly long before challenging an infringing use;17 and
one circuit, apparently suffering from its own internal
conflict, has produced conflicting and irreconcilably
contradictory rulings both ways on the matter.18
16

Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614 (5th Cir.
2013); Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza Inc., 752 F.2d 145 (5th
Cir. 1985); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Clair, 123 F.2d 878 (8th
Cir. 1941); Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817
(8th Cir. 1931); Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.
2000); Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362 (6th
Cir. 1985).
17
Univ. of Pittsburg v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040
(3d Cir. 1982); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co., 175
F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950); SevenUp Co. v. O-So-Grape, Co., 283 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1960); RBC
Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 410 F. App’x 362 (2d Cir.
2010); Black Diamond Sportswear, Inc. v. Black Diamond
Equip., Ltd., No. 06-3508-cv, 2007 WL 2914452 (2d Cir. Oct. 5,
2007); Kason Indus., Inc. v. Component Hardware Grp., Inc., 120
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1997); NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
18
Compare Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243
F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that laches does not apply
in claims for injunctive relief) with Ray Commc’ns, Inc. v. Clear
Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294, 307 (4th Cir. 2012)
(holding that “laches may act as a bar to both monetary and
injunctive relief under certain circumstances.”).

9
A broad review of trademark opinions dealing with
these equitable doctrines reveals that clear guidance
is presently unavailable, and that as a result of this
Court’s prolonged silence on these issues, the law of
laches and acquiescence has become muddled.
One source of confusion is that courts assign
different meanings to the same words. The terms
“laches,” “estoppel” and “acquiescence” are sometimes
treated as synonyms for the same doctrine.19 In
contrast, some courts use these terms with precision
to indicate three distinct equitable doctrines with
distinctly different implications for remedies.20 These
courts use “laches” to mean an unreasonable delay on
the part of the plaintiff.21 Sometimes they describe
laches as the result of “mere delay” without more.
Laches ordinarily bars claims for damages, but not
injunctive relief. By contrast, “estoppel by laches,”
means not only that the plaintiff has delayed, but the
delay has induced reliance or resulted in other prejudice that estops the plaintiff from obtaining any relief
on its trademark claim.22 And “acquiescence” refers to
the plaintiff ’s consent – sometimes explicit and other
19

Some courts have also incorrectly included the term
“abandonment” in discussions of these equitable doctrines. See,
e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 175 F.2d at 375.
20
Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971
F.2d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that laches and estoppel
are entirely separate defenses).
21
6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:2.
22
Kason Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d at 1203; 6 McCarthy on
Trademarks § 31:2.
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times implicit – to the defendant’s use of a trademark. Like estoppel by laches, acquiescence typically
bars all relief.
The confusion is not, however, only a matter of
semantics. Courts are also applying different rules to
similar facts. Thus, some courts have adopted a
liberal understanding of estoppel by laches in trademark cases. Under this approach, estoppel by laches
can be proven even in the absence of evidence that
the defendant relied on the plaintiff ’s inaction in
23
asserting a claim. That is, a case in which the defendant did not know about the existence of the
plaintiff will be treated the same as a case in which
the defendant relied on the plaintiff ’s failure to assert
a claim after declaring its rights. Other courts draw a
distinction between estoppel, which requires specific
reliance evidence, and laches, which does not.
The Fifth Circuit blurs the lines between these
doctrines. In this case, for example, the court approved
the jury’s instruction on laches that specifically
required the defendant to establish reliance – an
element of “estoppel by laches.”24 So the Fifth Circuit’s
23

6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:13; Procter & Gamble Co.
v. J.L. Prescott Co., 102 F.2d 773 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939); Chandon
Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531 (2d
Cir. 1964); E-Systems, Inc. v. Monitek, Inc., 720 F.2d 604 (9th
Cir. 1983); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813 (7th
Cir. 1999); Chattanoga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 301 F.3d 789, 795
(7th Cir. 2002).
24
Abraham, 708 F.3d at 624 (“ ‘An unlicensed user is
unduly prejudiced when, in reliance on the trademark owner’s
(Continued on following page)

11
definition of “laches” actually encompasses what this
Court would have called “estoppel by laches” But
defining laches to require a showing of detrimental
reliance fails to give meaning to every word in section
33(b)(8), and will render Congress’s identification of
25
laches and estoppel as separate doctrines ineffective.
Courts have similarly muddled the doctrines of
acquiescence and laches together. Some courts use
the word acquiescence in a context in which it is not
clear that this term has any legal distinction from
laches.26 Other courts use the term acquiescence to
denote those cases in which the trademark owner
actively conveys its consent to the defendant.27
unexcused delay in filing suit, he or she makes major business
investments or expansions that depend on the use of the
marks. . . .’ ”) (quoting the district court).
25
Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club
De L’Quest De La France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1042 “reliance is not a
requirement of laches but is essential to equitable estoppel”).
26
Conan Props., Inc., 752 F.2d (referencing both laches and
acquiescence throughout the opinion without explicitly stating
which doctrine is being applied though providing separate
definitions for each).
27
Kellogg Co., 209 F.3d at 569 (“Although both laches and
acquiescence require proof that the party seeking to enforce its
trademark rights has unreasonably delayed pursuing litigation
and, as a result, materially prejudiced the alleged infringer,
acquiescence requires more”); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Although the doctrines
of acquiescence and laches, in the context of trademark law, both
connote consent by the owner to an infringing use of his mark,
acquiescence implies active consent, while laches implies a
merely passive consent”).

12
Not surprisingly, many of those courts that consider
acquiescence to be a distinct doctrine also view acquiescence as stopping the trademark owner from obtaining a remedy for infringement.28
Some courts use the statute of limitations for an
analogous state law to measure the period of damages
in a trademark case, while others courts do not.29
Even in cases in which an analogous statute of limitations is imposed, trademark infringement is a
continuing tort.30
Separating the doctrines of acquiescence and
laches is important, lest we neglect the significance
of a trademark owner’s cooperation with infringement that foreseeably leads to public confusion.
Surprisingly, some courts that use acquiescence and
laches interchangeably, such as the Fifth Circuit,
have held that the possibility of public confusion
justifies injunctive relief even in cases where the
trademark owner is found to have consented, either
implicitly or explicitly, to an infringing use. The
trademark owner, however, presumably has an interest in preventing any use of its mark that could
28

What-A-Burger of Virginia v. Whataburger, Inc. of Corpus
Christi, Texas, 357 F.3d 441, 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Sara Lee,
81 F.3d at 462 “[a]n infringement action may be barred . . .
where the owner of the trademark, by conveying to the defendant through affirmative word or deed, expressly or impliedly
consents to the infringement.”).
29
6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:23.
30
Id. § 31:1.
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weaken its identity or create public confusion. Why
then should the defense of acquiescence ever be
qualified by dubious policy concerns about public
confusion? Whether the trademark owner undervalued the mark or simply miscalculated the likelihood
that confusion would result from its consent to an
infringing use, the defense of acquiescence clearly
places the burden of that mistake on the imprudent
trademark owner complicit in the weakening of its
own mark.31
In the case of a trademark owner’s inaction, on
the other hand, determining with whom such burden
ought to reside is less straightforward. Any laches
assessment would naturally look to the length of the
trademark owner’s delay in policing its rights, its
awareness of the infringing use, the extent of the
investment made by the infringer, and what public
confusion might be avoided by granting injunctive
relief.32 This last is perhaps the principal legal
difference between how the doctrines of acquiescence
and laches ought to play out practically: in a laches
case concerning a trademark owner’s inaction and
harmful delay in the enforcement of its rights, the
trademark owner’s own behavior does not necessarily,
31

On the other hand, if an initial use to which the trademark owner acquiesced later developed into other unforeseen
uses that would create confusion the trademark owner would
have recourse to the protections of the doctrine of progressive
encroachment.
32
6 McCarthy on Trademarks §§ 31:1, 31:10.

14
as it would in a case of acquiescence, constitute a
waiver of the possibility that the infringing use might
lead to public confusion.33 It is not credible that
trademark owners complicit in the potential creation
of public confusion surrounding their marks should
be saved by that same confusion. Surely complicity in
the potential weakening of one’s trademark must bar
injunctive relief.
Of course, blatant inaction, extreme delay, or
flagrant disregard for the enforcement of trademark
protections by a trademark owner would tend to
suggest that the infringing use in question was
unlikely to create public confusion. Again, it is presumed that no trademark owner would long allow an
infringing use that clearly confused or weakened the
identity of its mark.
In sharp contrast to the situation in trademark
law, in patent law a very precise laches doctrine has
been adopted. For instance, in patent law laches is
34
presumed from a six year period of delay. A finding
of laches will bar monetary damages, but not injunctive relief in patent law.35 Estoppel by laches exists in
33

Id. § 31:10 (“If it is inevitable that a significant amount of
confusion will probably be created by the junior user’s actions,
then the right of the public not to be confused and deceived may
outweigh the inequity to the junior user of the trademark
owner’s delay in suing.”)
34
A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032.
35
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Laches as defense in
patent infringement suit, 35 A.L.R. Fed. 551 (Supp. 2013).

15
patent law only when the patent owner threatens
vigorous enforcement and then unreasonably delays
in filing suit.36 Because public policy rationales differ
in patent, copyright, and trademark law the relationship between laches and injunctions should not
necessarily be the same in each of these areas of
law, however, a brief examination of patent law seems
to suggest that precise equitable doctrines are an
achievable goal in other areas of intellectual property
law.
Unfortunately applying these equitable defenses
imprecisely in the context of trademark law creates
problems that are highly particular to that area of
law and which cannot be resolved by a review of these
equitable doctrines in other areas of law. Nowhere so
much as in trademark law does public confusion go to
the heart of the matter and yet it is discussed inexactly with the potential result that these simple
and articulable defenses based on time, prejudice,
and reliance fail to have effect.
Of course, there are other doctrines in trademark
law that countenance the likelihood of pubic confusion in favor of equitable relations among competitors; for example, under the doctrine of genericism
none may federally register a generic mark, like “lite
37
beer,” despite the likelihood of public confusion that
36

A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1042.
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d
75, 81 (7th Cir. 1977).
37
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would ensue might others adopt that same mark.
This rule is meant to prevent the negative market
consequences that would ensue should a single entity
come to monopolize the generic name for a good. Public confusion does not supersede such consequences.38
However, the uncertain impact of laches and
acquiescence defenses leaves trademark holders, or
more specifically business people, uncertain as to how
to safely proceed with their affairs.39 These uncertainties multiply to impede business decisions. Further,
litigants uncertain of the impact of these defenses in
trademark cases are likely to include these defenses
“just to be safe,” which extra legal costs ultimately
get passed on to the consumer through inflated
product costs, not to mention wasted judicial resources.40 Lastly, the fractured state of the law on
these matters encourages forum shopping.41 These
issues certainly concern negative consequences to the
market and to trademark holders.
We believe that if the courts were more precise in
their discussions and determinations of laches and
38

McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:2.
Meredith M. Wilkes & Anne E. Raimer, Preliminary
Injunctions in U.S. Trademark Infringement Cases and the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 68 INTA Bull., 7 (2013); Ryan
McLeod, Note, Injunction Junction: Remembering the Proper
Function and Form of Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 13
Duke L. & Tech. R. 0013 (2006).
40
McLeod, supra note 39.
41
Wilkes & Raimer, supra note 39.
39
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acquiescence, trademark litigants would likely be
more restrained in their application of these doctrines, and we might see less of these defenses asserted. More clarity in this area would serve the
litigants, the courts, and the public.
III. This Case Is a Good Vehicle to Address
When Laches and Acquiescence Should
Bar Relief.
This case is a good vehicle to clarify the distinctions between the equitable doctrines of laches,
acquiescence and estoppel and to address when
laches and acquiescence should bar relief. First, the
Fifth Circuit’s application of the doctrine of estoppel
by laches unreasonably muddles these doctrines
together. Second, the presence of both laches and
acquiescence defenses in this case provide a useful
opportunity to consider the two doctrines and to
delineate their differences. Third, there is no merit in
delaying resolution of this issue further, and that in
fact further delay will only deepen the existing division and confusion among the courts of appeals.
Congress identified laches, estoppel, and acquiescence as “equitable principles” in the Lanham Act.42
By so labeling them, Congress presumably intended
that they apply to equitable remedies, as distinct

42

15 U.S.C. § 33(b)(9).
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from monetary awards or damages.43 That is their
historical origin. They were the equitable analogs to
the statute of limitations that define how long one
can wait before bringing a cause for damages. By
including them in section 33(b), Congress made clear
that they, like the other doctrines listed in sections
33(b)(1)-(8), bar relief, perhaps against only this
defendant, but still they bar remedies. Equitable
defenses intuitively apply to equitable remedies, but
the Fifth Circuit’s decision here did the opposite,
which is at least counterintuitive, and deserves a
second look.
Similar to the special regime for injunctive relief
at issue in eBay Inc. v. Merc-Exchange,44 courts have
crafted a trademark-specific laches doctrine that is
not consistent with laches as an equitable defense in
other areas of law. They have done so ostensibly to
ensure that consumers are protected. Courts do not
want the trademark owner’s delay to force consumers
to endure confusion that only the trademark owner
43

Congress specifically provided in section 33(a) that any
award of damages under the Lanham Trademark Act is “subject
to the principles of equity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
44
547 U.S. 388 (2006). While citing eBay, the Fifth Circuit
rejected its holding. It relied on McCarthy’s pre-eBay statement
that irreparable injury is presumed in trademark cases once
infringement has been shown. Abraham, 708 F.3d at 626. A
district court in the Fifth Circuit is already relying on the
decision in this case to push back on eBay and hold that irreparable harm can sometimes be presumed in trademark cases. See
Clearline Techs., Ltd. v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., ___ F. Supp.2d ___,
2013 WL 2422581 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2013).
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has the legal right to stop. But where there is a real
consumer interest at stake, trademark owners act
swiftly.
Certainly an injunction should not issue as a
matter of course unless the mark holder proves that
the public interest requires an injunction once laches
or acquiescence have been proved. In a case such as
this in which the theory of confusion is based on
unauthorized merchandizing, there is no heightened
concern for the public’s interest to be free from confusion.
This case is a good candidate for review because
it will allow the Court to explain how much confusion
might justify an injunction in the face of a successful
laches or acquiescence defense. In this case, the court
found a “likelihood of confusion” when it found infringement. But if a “likelihood of confusion” would be
sufficient to justify an injunction in every case, then
an injunction would always issue, whether laches or
acquiescence were found or not. Thus, in order to
preserve this statutory defense, courts must in some
way quantify the level of confusion, something the
Fifth Circuit did not do in this case. Other courts
have taken divergent positions on the level of confusion. This case provides a good vehicle to determine
the necessary level of public confusion because the
level of confusion in this case is low.
In analyzing the fourth factor under eBay, asking
whether an injunction would disserve the public
interest, the district court noted the public interest in
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avoiding confusion.45 However, this rote recital of
possible confusion is plainly insufficient under eBay.46
There was simply no evidence in the case that the
confusion at issue – whether the Plaintiffs had or had
not authorized the Defendants’ paddles – played any
material role in consumer purchasing decisions.
Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the possibility of
confusion, the district court and the Fifth Circuit
failed to recognize the public interest in competition
and the loss consumers would suffer as a result of the
monopoly that the injunction created.
In sum, we urge the Court to review this case in
order to provide much needed correction to the application of the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and estoppel in trademark law.
------------------------------------------------------------------

45

Abraham, 708 F.3d at 627.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (stating that traditional equitable
principles such as the application of injunctive relief do not
permit broad classifications and the application of the four
factors must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis).
46
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
grant the petition to clarify that the doctrine of laches
and acquiescence are distinct and that they bar all
relief in this case.
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